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similarities between article 2315 and Louisiana's Workmen's
Compensation Act ° and felt that Levy v. Louisiana,5 a wrong-
ful death case, was binding.52 Should there arise a United
States Supreme Court decision mandating equal treatment of
a surviving spouse and a concubine under the workmen's com-
pensation law, such a decision might be binding in a subse-
quent constitutional attack on the wrongful death provisions.
The decision in Henderson is palatable, particularly as a
recognition of the impropriety of using "moral unworthiness"
as a factor in awarding workmen's compensation benefits. By
removing the moral judgment, this decision realizes the true
purpose of a compensation scheme in an industrial so-
ciety-compensation for dependents. However, as discussed
earlier," several problems lie ahead. It is submitted that the
problems of a constitutional dimension could be eliminated by
amending the death benefits provisions. By substituting one
term such as "consort" for "spouse," "widow," and "widower,"
and by ascribing to "consort" a definition requiring living to-
gether in a permanent relationship, the courts could address
each situation with needed flexibility and an awareness of the
purpose behind the act, while adhering to the spirit of the
present case."
William Mark Claudel
A CAUTIOUS STEP FORWARD
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding alleging commission
of first degree murder by a juvenile, the juvenile court denied
pretrial motions requesting a public trial, a trial by jury, and
50. The Court noted that both the wrongful death provisions and the workmen's
compensation law were "state-created compensation schemes" benefiting close rela-
tives and dependents of the deceased and that both were "outgrowths and modifica-
tions of our basic tort law, designed to soften the often harsh common-law rules."
406 U.S. at 171-72.
51. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
52. 406 U.S. at 168-72.
53. See text at notes 36-52, supra.
54. Although such an amendment could possibly have the effect of sanctioning
concubinage, the simplicity and ease of administration which would result strongly
militate in favor of it.
[Vol. 39
NOTES
the suppression of an inculpatory statement. The Louisiana
Supreme Court granted certiorari' and held that the juvenile's
waiver of his right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination had been ineffective because the state had failed
to establish that there had been a meaningful consultation with
an adult interested in the juvenile's welfare and fully advised
of his rights prior to the waiver. The supreme court also held
that, during an adjudication of delinquency involving acts that
would constitute a crime if engaged in by an adult, a juvenile
has the option of a public trial, but no right to a trial by jury.,
In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
When the juvenile courts were first established, their task
was not to determine criminal culpability, but rather to decide
what should be done in the child's best interest.' Because of
this emphasis on helping the child, juvenile court procedure
was to be flexible and completely different from the procedure
in a criminal court.' The proceedings were private to save the
child from the taint of public stigma, and trial by jury was
considered inappropriate because it implied a formal criminal
procedure and interfered with the moral and educational influ-
ences of the judge.5 Constitutional attacks on these informal
proceedings were dismissed on the grounds that the state was
acting as a parent under the parens patriae doctrine, and that
the juvenile courts were civil courts, not criminal ones. Thus,
constitutional guarantees were replaced with attempts to
1. In re Dino, 353 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978).
2. Each of the issues was decided by a close margin. Although Justice Dennis
wrote the majority opinion, he also wrote a separate opinion dissenting as to the
holding on the jury trial issue and assigning additional reasons for the holding on the
public trial issue. Thus, the opinion of the court might be called a plurality opinion,
although referred to as a majority opinion in this note and by Justice Dennis in his
separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Only Justice Tate did not
write or join in a separate opinion. By comparing all of the opinions in the case, and
those justices who agreed with them, it is clear that only Justice Tate wanted to grant
the right to a public trial and at the same time deny the right to a trial by jury. The
remaining justices either wanted to grant the right to both a public and a jury trial or
wanted to deny the right to both. It should also be noted that the majority opinion,
while basing its holdings on the Louisiana Constitution, relied extensively on federal
jurisprudence for its rationale, especially in the public and jury trial areas.
3. Comment, The Juvenile Court, 23 H~Av. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1920).
4. M. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF JUVENILE COURTS AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
5 (1975).
5. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 132, 137 (1927).
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achieve the rehabilitation, education, and salvation of the
child .
It eventually became apparent that there was a wide gulf
between the juvenile court's theoretical purpose and its day-to-
day realities.' The parens patriae and civil court arguments
that had so long barred due process to the juvenile received a
death blow from the United States Supreme Court in In re
Gault.' The Supreme Court noted that the meaning of parens
patriae was' murky and that its historical credentials were of
dubious relevance.' The Court also viewed the civil label as one
of mere convenience and its invocation as a feeble enticement
to disregard the constitutional problems presented in delin-
quency proceedings.'"
Although Gault broke the due process barrier for juvenile
court proceedings, it does not stand for the proposition that
6. M. PAULSEN, supra note 4, at 5.
7. Both the United States Supreme Court and a presidential commission noted
that juvenile courts, in general, had not lived up to the high hopes originally held for
them. The Supreme Court stated:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile
courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether
actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make
tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties
applicable to adults.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). That the presidential commission
came to the same conclusion can be seen by comparing the statement in Kent with
the following conclusion of the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice:
Studies conducted by the Commission, legislative inquiries in various
States, and reports by informed observers compel the conclusion that the great
hopes originally held for the juvenile court have not been fulfilled. It has not
succeeded significantly in rehabilitating delinquent youth, in reducing or even
stemming the tide of delinquency, or in bringing justice and compassion to the
child offender.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIErv 80 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
CHALLENGE1.
8. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. Id. at 16. The doctrine of parens patriae originated in civil matters in English
Chancery law. H. Lou, supra note 5, at 2-7. It was not until the jurisdiction over
neglected, dependent, and delinquent children was consolidated in the first juvenile
court that the parens patriae concept was applied to what had previously been a
criminal matter. Prior to the first juvenile court, a child over seven years of age could
have been tried and convicted in criminal court as if he were an adult. M. PAULSEN,
supra note 4, at 3-4.
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50.
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juveniles charged with delinquency are entitled to all of the
rights enjoyed by an adult accused of a crime." Gault pre-
sented a sweeping rationale, but a limited holding." This di-
chotomy between rationale and result can be resolved by view-
ing juvenile court proceedings, in general, as neither wholly
criminal nor wholly civil; juvenile courts are hybrids' 3 and their
proceedings are sui generis. 14 Thus, the question becomes
which guarantees are necessary to protect the child, and the
test developed by the United States Supreme Court is whether
a particular guarantee is necessary to insure fundamental fair-
ness in a juvenile proceeding. 5 In applying this test after Gault,
the Supreme Court has held that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard must be used in a delinquency proceeding, but that a
trial by jury is not required. 7
In re Dino'8 presented the Louisiana Supreme Court with
three separate areas of juvenile rights: the right to trial by jury,
the right to a public trial, and waiver of the right to counsel
and the privilege against self-incrimination. As to the waiver
issue, the court concluded that Dino's inculpatory statement
should have been suppressed because there had been no con-
11. Id. at 30-31. The Court reiterated the view originally expressed in Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), that the hearing need not conform to all of the
requirements of a criminal trial or even the usual administrative hearing; but the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
12. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1971); In re Terry, 438 Pa.
339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970). The United States Supreme Court in McKeiver cited the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Terry with approval for the conclusion that Gault
presented a sweeping rationale, but a limited holding.
For example, the Court in Gault, stated, "The essential difference between
(Gerald Gault'sl case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to
adults were discarded in Gerald's case." 387 U.S. at 29. Despite this sweeping language
which led the Court to require the right to counsel, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the right to notice in delinquency proceedings, the Court declined
to rule on the issues of the right to appellate review and the right to transcripts of the
proceedings. Id. at 58.
13. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 407 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
JUVENILE JUSTICE]; Comment, Fairness in Juvenile Court, 27 LA. L. REv. 606, 608
(1967).
14. Cart, Juries for Juveniles: Solving the Dilemma, 2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (1971).
15. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 543; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363
(1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31.
16. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
17. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 545.
18. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
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sultation with an adult who was interested in Dino's welfare
and fully advised of his rights, prior to the time when Dino
waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination.' 9 Because juveniles are presumed not to be ma-
ture enough to understand their rights or competent enough to
exercise them, fundamental fairness requires that they not be
permitted to waive constitutional rights without the aid of an
adult. Therefore, the state was required to establish the occur-
rence of such a consultation in order to meet its burden of
showing a knowing and intelligent waiver.20
Dino's counsel had requested a public trial due to the
pretrial publicity involved in the case, feeling that such a trial
was necessary to exonerate Dino in the public's eye. 2' The
Louisiana statute which prohibited a public trial in juvenile
proceedings 22 was declared unconstitutional by the supreme
court insofar as it prohibited juveniles from electing a public
trial in an adjudicatory proceeding based on criminal charges
which would entitle an adult to have his trial conducted in
public. The court found that the option of public trial was
essential to meeting the due process and fair treatment require-
ments of article I, section 2, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitu-
tion l3 because a public trial protects the accused by exposing
improper judicial behavior to the indignation of the com-
munity at large 24
On the other hand, the supreme court found that article
I, section 2, does not require a jury trial for a juvenile during
the adjudication of a'charge of delinquency. However, beyond
a vague reference to the United States Supreme Court's rea-
sons in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 5 no reasons were given as a
19. Id. at 594.
20. Id.
21. Brief for Andrew Leonard Dino at 7, In re Dino, No. 1356 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1977).
22. LA. R.S. 13:1579(B) (Supp. 1972 & 1977) provides:
The general public shall be excluded from hearings under this section. Only the
child, his counsel, witnesses, the child's parents, tutor or other custodian, the
officers of the court, and any other persons as the court finds have a legitimate
or proper interest in the proceedings or in the work of the court may be admitted
by the court.
23. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, except by due process of law."
24. 359 So. 2d at 597.
25. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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basis for this holding.8 As to which reasons in McKeiver were
similar to those supporting the holding in the instant case, or
how they were similar, both the majority opinion and the con-
curring opinions were silent.
With regard to the waiver issue, article I, section 13, of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution27 requires that the Miranda"
warnings be clear and easily understood, and that any waiver
be the result of a voluntary relinquishment of a known privilege
based on full understanding of what is being waived.29 Since the
presumed immaturity of juveniles presents special waiver
problems in the areas of coercion, suggestion, ignorance of
rights, and even "adolescent fantasy, fright or despair,"' ' it is
logical to augment the normal Miranda requirements with
26. 359 So. 2d at 598. Justice Dennis, joined by Justices Dixon and Calogero,
dissented as to the holding denying the right to trial by jury. Justice Dennis reasoned
that because a juvenile faces consequences not essentially different from those faced
by adult criminal defendants, denial of a jury trial to a juvenile charged with an offense
which would entitle an adult to jury trial is an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimina-
tion on the basis of age. Therefore, denial of a jury trial to a juvenile constituted a
denial of equal protection under article I, section 3, of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.
Justice Dennis also stated that, in addition to the due process reasons given in the
majority opinion, the same equal protection argument would require a juvenile to have
the right to demand a public trial. 359 So. 2d at 602-07 (Dennis, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). As to Justice Dennis' conclusion that juveniles face risks not
essentially different from those faced by criminal defendants, see notes 58 and 59,
infra, and accompanying text. See also In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978). In
Causey, Justice Tate, writing for a majority of the court, noted that the approach used
by the United States Supreme Court inquired not only into whether a particular right
was historically part of fundamental fairness, but also into whether granting that
particular right would interfere with any of the beneficial aspects of juvenile proceed-
ings. Id. at 474. Hence, only those rights which were too important to sacrifice in favor
of the theoretical benefits would be required. Id. Justice Tate went on to note that the
above approach had been adopted by the majority of the court in the instant case, In
re Dino. Id. Furthermore, Justice Tate viewed McKeiver as centering on the func-
tion served by jury trial rather than on the degree of "fundamentality," and noted
that, according to McKeiver, the jury was not a necessary component of accurate fact-
finding. Id. at 475.
27. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13, provides:
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investiga-
tion or commission of any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his
arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self-
incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to
court appointed counsel.
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 LA. L. REV. 1, 44 (1974).
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
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extra protection for the juvenile. As the Louisiana Supreme
Court noted in Dino, the use of the totality of the circumstan-
ces test for juveniles "tends to mire the courts in a morass of
speculation similar to that from which Miranda was designed
to extricate them in adult cases." 3' Thus, the additional re-
quirement of a consultation with an adult, before waiver is
effective, performs the same function of avoiding constant
courtroom speculation in the juvenile context as the Miranda
warnings alone perform in the adult context."
In the areas of public and jury trials, Dino seems to provide
another example of a limited holding accompanied by a sweep-
ing rationale. The court stated that juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings were "not essentially different from a criminal trial' 33
and consequently granted the right to a public trial. Yet the
court later held that juveniles were not entitled to a trial by
jury.3 ' However, the results achieved are not as inconsistent as
it would seem at first blush. In a separate opinion in McKeiver,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Brennan
noted that jury trial and public trial provide a similar protec-
tion." Both a jury and a public trial provide a check on possible
31. 359 So. 2d at 591.
32. But see id. at 598-601 (Sanders, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Chief Justice Sanders, joined by Justice Marcus, dissented as to the majority
holding on this issue and stated that the "totality of the circumstances" test should
be used. Using that test, Chief Justice Sanders did not find an adequate reason for
disturbing the juvenile court's ruling not to suppress Dino's statement. Id. at 599-601.
However, Justice Summers, while agreeing that the test to be used should be the
"totality of the circumstances," felt that Dino's statement should be suppressed. Id.
at 601-02 (Summers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This disagreement
as to result, under the "totality of the circumstances" test, seems to provide a small
example of why a further prophylactic device, beyond those contained in Miranda, is
necessary in the juvenile waiver area.
33. Id. at 595.
34. Id. at 598,
35. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 554-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). A comparison of the leading cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court in the area of public and jury trials points out the similarity of
function between public and jury trial. As to public trial, the Court has found that
"[tihe knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial
power." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). Similarly, the Court has found that a
jury trial provides a "safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge" and that the insistence upon com-
munity participation in the determination of guilt or innocence is an expression in the
criminal law of a fear of unchecked power. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
NOTES
abuse of power on the part of the judge or prosecutor by involv-
ing the community in the case; the public trial performs this
function by making the proceedings open to inspection by the
community, and the jury trial performs it through community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.36 It is
because of this similarity between the functions of public and
jury trials that Justice Brennan would hinge his granting of a
jury trial on whether the juvenile had a right to a public trial. 7
Justice Brennan's opinion has been influential, 3 and the su-
preme court in Dino seemed to recognize his position when it
noted that a public trial worked analagously to a jury trial.39
Thus, the results in Dino are not as inconsistent as they seem
in that when a juvenile elects to have a public trial he receives
a protection similar to that provided by a jury trial.
The instant case demonstrates that the granting of a pub-
lic trial option is not inconsistent with the juvenile justice ideal
of avoiding stigma,40 because Dino needed an open trial to
counteract the stigma resulting from pre-trial publicity.' Since
the choice of whether or not to have a public trial rests with
the juvenile, the right will not conflict with the juvenile justice
goal of avoiding stigma, and at the same time it will perform a
function similar to that of a jury trial in the cases where a
juvenile chooses to have a public trial.
It should also be noted that the court, while granting a
(1968). Thus, one purpose of both the public and the jury trial is to provide a check
on the abuse of court power, and this check is provided by community involvement.
36. Justice Brennan noted that the Constitution has rejected the idea that public
trial is an adequate substitute for trial by jury in serious adult cases, but that public
trial may be enough in juvenile delinquency cases because juvenile courts, despite
some failure in practice, demonstrate by their very existence the community's sympa-
thy and concern for the young. 403 U.S. at 555 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Another reason for finding that a protection is adequate in the
juvenile delinquency context, but not adequate in the adult context, is that juveniles
do not face consequences as serious as those faced by adult criminal defendants. See
notes 58 and 59, infra, and accompanying text.
37. 403 U.S. at 554-57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. A recent federal committee quoted directly from Justice Brennan's opinion
in McKeiver in its commentary on the recommendation to allow the public trial option
to juveniles. JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 381. The Committee later commented
that the grant of a public trial would do much to compensate for the recommendation
against the right to trial by jury. Id. at 421.
39. 359 So. 2d at 597.
40. See note 7, supra, and accompanying text.
41. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
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right that does not conflict with the juvenile justice ideals, did
so without any significant impact on the mechanics of the juve-
nile court system. Implementation of the option of a public
trial should have only a minimal impact on juvenile court oper-
ation because the proceedings themselves remain essentially
unaltered, the only difference being admission of the general
public to the trial. On the other hand, granting the right to a
jury trial could have a significant impact on juvenile court
operations-an impact which might be more detrimental than
beneficial.
While the option of a public trial provides a double benefit
in cases similar to Dino, this is not true of all juvenile delin-
quency cases. If a juvenile has not been subjected to the
pretrial publicity that Dino was, he is forced to decide between
inviting stigma by electing to have a public trial or foregoing
the protection provided by either a public or a jury trial be-
cause, under Dino, a jury trial is unavailable. Because a juve-
nile may not always be able to afford to choose a public trial
to achieve the safeguard of community involvement, it is still
necessary to evaluate whether the right to a jury trial is neces-
sary for fundamental fairness in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings.
In determining whether a trial by jury is necessary for
fundamental fairness in juvenile delinquency proceedings, it is
necessary to consider the benefits and drawbacks of a jury trial.
As already noted, one benefit of a jury trial is that it can pro-
vide a protection similar to that provided by a public trial in
those cases where the choice of a public trial would be in con-
flict with the juvenile justice ideal of avoiding stigma. Further-
more, while a jury and a public trial provide a similar protec-
tion, the jury provides a more direct check on the judicial pro-
cess by actually determining guilt or innocence.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of a jury trial is its effect on
the reasonable doubt standard, which is required in juvenile
delinquency proceedings." A "frequently cited study of Ameri-
can juries"' 3 concluded that disagreements between judge and
42. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
43. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 374 n.12 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring
in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)). The study referred to, H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), was undertaken by the University of Chicago Law
[Vol. 39
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jury were not as frequent as might have been expected." How-
ever, a significant factor in cases where the judge and jury
disagreed as fact finders was their different treatment of the
reasonable doubt standard. The study found that the jury, in
general, required more proof to reach the threshold of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" than did a judge. 5 Thus, a juvenile could
acquire the benefit of a more strict interpretation of the reason-
able doubt standard by having the right to a trial by jury.
In contrast to the above benefits, there are possible draw-
backs of a trial by jury which must be considered. One poten-
tial disadvantage of requiring jury trials is that unnecessary
formality would be injected into juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings.4" Closely linked to this potential increase in formality is
the probability of increased expenditure of court time and
other resources," not only in delinquency proceedings, but in
all juvenile proceedings. The detrimental effect on time and
School and involved a decade of research. The United States Supreme Court has
referred to the study as, "[tihe most complete statistical study of jury behavior,"
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 n.5 (1972), and as "the most recent and exhaus-
tive study of the jury in criminal cases," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 & n.
26 (1968).
44. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 43, at 198. This finding may have been
the reason that the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe imposition of the jury trial on
the juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding func-
tion .... " McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 547.
45. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 43, at 182-90.
46. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 38 (1967). This
report cites three areas of formality which are likely to be injected into a jury trial.
They are: (1) the formality of the proceedings designed to instill in the jurors a sense
of the seriousness and solemnity of their duties; (2) the formal, restrictive rules of
evidence, designed to protect the jury from prejudicial and irrelevant evidence and aid
them in distinguishing between the more and the less probative; and (3) the theatrical
presentation of the evidence emphasized by some attorneys when arguing a case to a
jury, as opposed to the more businesslike approach used when presenting a case to a
judge. Id.
47. The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
in its first report felt that the benefits of a jury trial in delinquency proceedings were
outweighed by the increase in cost in terms of court time and other resources. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 303 (1973).
In a later and more extensive report, the Committee came to the same conclusion citing
the "excessive formality and delay" caused by a jury trial. JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
13, at 421. In comparing these two reports, it seems that formality could be considered
a factor in the increased cost in court time and other resources. If formality increases
the time that it takes to hear a case, this increases the overall cost of court operation
in the same manner that the additional time necessary to impanel a jury does.
19781
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cost can clearly be seen in the District of Columbia experience
with juvenile jury trials. The right of trial by jury in juvenile
proceedings was withdrawn"8 after a dramatic increase in the
number of jury trials."9 This increase in the number of such
trials had the effect of "increasing delays in all juvenile cases
above and beyond the delay which is to be expected as a result
of the increase in the number of cases coming into the court.""
Other factors must be considered which can not be labeled
simply as benefits or drawbacks of a jury trial. There has been
a significant de-emphasis of the importance of the right to trial
by jury in decisions of the United States Supreme Court subse-
quent to Duncan v. Louisiana.5' Later cases have held that
Duncan is to have prospective effect only52 and that twelve-
member juries53 and unanimous verdicts" are unnecessary.
These decisions call into question whether the right to trial by
jury is as important as other constitutional rights," and they
significantly dilute the importance of the jury in the reasonable
doubt standard. By not requiring unanimous verdicts, the
48. D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2316, as amended by District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 121, 84 Stat. 473
(1970).
49. COURT MANAGEMENT STUDY, REPORT FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNITED STATES SENATE, pt. 2, at 228 (1970).
Table 21
Juvenile Cases June 30, 1967 June 30, 1968 June 30, 1969
Court Trials 134 242 358
Jury Trials 34 187 290
50. Anti-Crime Proposals: Hearings on H.R. 14334, H.R. 14224 and H.R. 14189,
H.R. 256, and H.R. 2747 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the District
of Columbia, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1970) (statement of Donald E. Santarelli, Deputy
Attorney General).
51. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
52. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
53. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
54. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S;
356, 362 (1972).
55. By holding that the right to trial by jury was to have prospective effect only,
the Supreme Court in effect ranked jury trial as less important than other rights, such
as the right to counsel, which have had retroactive effect. A further example of the jury
trial being less important than other rights can be seen in the juvenile delinquency
context by comparing Gault, which found the right to counsel necessary for fundamen-
tal fairness, with McKeiver, which found trial by jury not necessary for fundamental
fairness.
NOTES
jury's collective threshold of proof of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is lowered by eliminating from consideration the juror
who was not persuaded enoughto convict." One author, com-
menting on the less than twelve-member juries and anticipat-
ing the non-unanimity decision, stated, "If we continue to re-
duce the power of the jury as it stood at common law, we may
soon confront the question as to why a jury at all or why so
much of it.""5 Thus, one of the major benefits to be derived
from granting a juvenile the right to trial by jury has been
significantly reduced.
In light of the decreased importance of the jury trial, both
practically and constitutionally, a jury trial may not add much
to fundamental fairness in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Furthermore, the due process requirements already in use may
be sufficient to insure fundamental fairness in those juvenile
delinquency cases where a public trial is undesirable. In addi-
tion, jury trials may not be needed as badly in delinquency
proceedings because the consequences faced by juveniles, while
serious, are not as serious as those faced by adult criminals. 5
While juvenile sentences are indefinite, juveniles cannot be
confined beyond their twenty-first birthday or for a longer time
than an adult could have been for the same offense.59 Thus,
56. Zeisel, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367, 369 (1972).
57. Id. at 370. The author is one of the coauthors of the study which noted the
importance of the jury in the reasonable doubt standard. See note 45, supra, and
accompanying text. However, the study was completed before Duncan, and the quoted
statement seems to call into question how much of a benefit trial by jury is after
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See notes 52 and 53, supra.
58. M. MIDONICK, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE COURTS: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
UNGOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT 97-98 (1972); Comment, supra note 15, at 608. Contra,
In re Dino 359 So. 2d at 602-07 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
wherein Justice Dennis stated that juveniles faced consequences not essentially differ-
ent from those faced by adult criminal defendants. Id. at 604. Justice Dennis pointed
out that the average term of confinement of juveniles exceeds six months and reprod-
uced statistics by the Louisiana Department of Corrections to back up his finding. Id.
at 602-03 & n.8. This finding certainly points to serious consequences faced by the
juvenile, but are they as serious as the consequences faced by adult criminal
defendants? The longest average confinement contained in the statistics used by Jus-
tice Dennis was 371 days-this was the average confinement for those juveniles leaving
between 1976 and 1977 who had been committed based on a charge of Robbery or
Extortion. No comparable statistics for adult criminals could be found, but one cannot
but wonder if the prison terms for adults confined on the same charges would average
only one year. Furthermore, the question must also be asked, is confinement in a
training school as serious as confinement in Angola?
59. LA. R.S. 13:1580(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1975 & 1977) provides:
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while Dino could have faced capital punishment or life impris-
onment as an adult, as a juvenile he faced, at worst, confine-
ment until age twenty-one.
Because juveniles do not face the same definite sentences
that adults do, the jury requirements of article I, section 17, of
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution ° are not readily applicable to
juvenile proceedings. Since article I, section 17, does not pro-
vide for which types of jury should be used in juvenile proceed-
ings, legislative action would be necessary to provide the an-
swer.
The application of article I, section 17, is but one of the
many areas where imposition of jury trials in delinquency pro-
ceedings presents difficulties; the problems demonstrate the
desirability of imposing jury trials by legislative scheme rather
than by judicial fiat. Furthermore, our knowledge about the
problems of delinquency and juvenile justice is grossly inade-
quate"' and a decision in this vacuum of knowledge should only
be made cautiously.
In sum, there is some doubt about whether a jury trial is
really necessary for juvenile delinquency proceedings to be fun-
damentally fair. Furthermore, the benefits of a jury trial in a
small number of cases may be outweighed by the profound
effects imposition of jury trials might have on the juvenile sys-
tem as a whole. Considering the lack of objective knowledge in
the juvenile justice area, and the short time frame since Gault,
it is not known if the due process requirements already imposed
are sufficient. Future studies and evaluation may show the
way.
A child over the age of thirteen who has been adjudged a proper person for
commitment, based on a finding of delinquency, may be confined for an indefi-
nite period, but in no case beyond his twenty-first birthday. However, no such
child shall be confined for a period which exceeds the length of time for which
an adult could be confined if convicted of the offense which formed the basis
for the adjudication of delinquency.
60. LA. CONsT. art. I, § 17 provides:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a
jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in
which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict. A
case in which the punishment may be confinement without hard labor for more
than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, five of whom must
concur to render a verdict.
61. JUVENILE JusTicE, supra note 13, at 15.
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If the right to a jury trial was imposed, maintaining a
separate juvenile court for delinquency proceedings might be
unnecessary because a district .court could hear a delinquency
proceeding as a criminal case with the only difference being the
dispositional alternatives available to the judge. However, such
a move would be undesirable. Although the problems of the
juvenile courts are serious, "the problems of the criminal
courts, particularly those of the lower courts that would fall
heir to much of the juvenile court jurisdiction, are even graver
... "" Furthermore, as delinquency proceedings become
more akin to criminal proceedings, it becomes more likely that
the attitude will develop that juvenile delinquents are no dif-
ferent from criminals.
Dino seems to represent a cautious step forward in the
juvenile due process area; it represents no radical departure
from current thought in the areas of public and jury trials."
Dino also seems to reflect a hesitance to deliver what could be
the coup de grace to the juvenile court with respect to its delin-
quency jurisdiction without allowing time for evaluation of
whether the due process requirements already in effect provide
fundamental fairness to the juvenile making further erosion of
the old ideals unnecessary.
Joseph G. Jarzabek
State v. Nelson: EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM A
PRIVATE SEARCH
Having reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had
stolen a diamond ring, two department store security guards
detained him under authority of Louisiana's "shoplifting stat-
ute."' During the detention, one guard, convinced that the de-
62. CHALLm EO, supra. note 7, at 81.
63. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971). In this case, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the statutory prohibition of jury trial and public trial for delinquents
violated the Alaska Constitution. This is the only decision requiring a jury trial, absent
a statutory mandate, since McKeiver. As to public trial, while the weight of authority
may not be in favor of granting this right, adopting the right to public trial is not
without support either. See notes 35-38, supra, and accompanying text.
1. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 215(A) states in pertinent part:
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